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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
PONTUS VILLEHARD ANDERSSON: How Startups Succeed: A Look at How 
Architectural Innovation Provides a Competitive Advantage 
(Under the direction of Tony Ammeter) 
 
 
The recent rise of high profile startups in the news and the prolific attention given to the 
entrepreneurial culture during an economic makes understanding how startups work a 
point of interest for many. The glamorization of shows like “Silicon Valley” and the 
growth of online personalities and their followers makes it even more exciting. But why 
do so many startups fail so drastically and a few reach unfathomable heights and why are 
household companies so interested in them? This paper addresses one of the underlying 
themes that drives business today, specifically, architectural innovation, or how 
companies organize. By following the diary of the CEO of a locally successful startup, 
this paper draws conclusions on how organizational architecture impacts a startup’s 
ability to acquire knowledge that allows it to be competitive. 
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I. Problem 
 
Startups continually create disruptive innovations in industries previously dominated 
by large established firms (Christensen, 1997; Lepore, 2014). The narrative is much 
always the same. An overwhelming lack of sufficient funding, partnerships, and 
resources historically point to a recipe for failure. The new innovative ideas or products 
they produce open avenues in existing markets. In this research project, I explore 
characteristics about new entrants that gives them a competitive business advantage over 
large established firms in developing innovative products, in particular innovations in 
organizing (termed ‘architectural innovations’) the structure of the firm. I focus on a 
nascent high-technology industry - smart mirrors - and seek to answer the research 
question “How does architectural innovation in startups lead to competitive business 
advantage over large established firms in the smart mirror market?” 
Plenty of new innovations enter the market place every day, yet only a few ever reach 
fruition with rates ranging from 47% to 90% depending on the market (Gourville, 2006; 
Cierpicki, Wright, Malcolm, & Sharp, 2000). Young firms are habitually not successful, 
with success rates ranging from 1 to 25% which makes those who do succeed so much 
more intriguing (Cusumano, 2013).  
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) have marketed success within the realm 
of business. Recent years have seen the returns of billion-dollar venture capital 
investments propelling small businesses such as Uber and Pinterest to new heights (Porat, 
2015). Disruptions amongst the firms in the tech industry are not new (Downes & Nunes, 
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2013). Whether the narrative encompasses news, transportation, or smart technology, 
ecosystems are being disrupted and moved in big ways by small companies. 
Their ability to make these changes comes with its fair share of challenges. We need 
to accept that SMEs are prone to failure. Hundreds of thousands of SMEs fall victim to 
the rigors of the economy and their industries, which makes the successes so important to 
study. Innovation by small enterprises shapes industries (Christensen, 2012; Clark & 
Henderson, 1990). When they succeed, they succeed big. The Ubers, Snapchats, and 
Airbnb’s of the world are widely known because they changed their industries. 
Additionally, their impact also changes the landscape of our economy (Kalak & Hudson, 
2015). Small firms are credited with creating new job opportunities and innovation 
regardless of the environment they exist in, which means the survival of these SMEs is 
paramount to tapping into their success over the long-term.  
Understanding this success starts with understanding the way these firms are 
structured. As venture capitalists change their approach from investing in ideas to 
investing in teams, it does not make sense to focus predominantly on the products or 
ideas these entrants pursue (Cusumano, 2013). Management ideas and structure allow for 
movement that is both decisive and responsive (Sedighadeli & Kachouie, 2013). This 
climate is what leads to new avenues or methodologies of development of projects 
(Christensen, 2012). Many of the difficulties established firms experience are tied to an 
inability to react responsively because they are unaware of how they should react (Velu, 
2015) or even if they should react (Christensen 1997). These larger firms keep doing the 
right things, acting almost entirely in the same interests as their young competitors, but 
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fail when it comes to implementing these new strategies because they lose sight of what 
their customers will want as opposed to what the firms wants (Christensen, 1997). 
 
II. Importance of Research 
 
The rise of new entrants in the marketplace has shifted investments in innovation. 
Disruptive companies like Airbnb, DraftKings, Tinder, and Uber have changed the way 
their industries think (Rivlin-Nadler, 2016). Their innovation is often unable to be 
replicated by established firms and allows them to gain solid entry to the market 
(Christensen, 1997). I hypothesize that these new entrants acquire knowledge differently 
than established firms. Frequently the focus of innovation rests on the products 
themselves which overshadow innovations in the company itself (Gourville, 2006; 
Lepore, 2014; Cusumano, 2013). What really determines the success of a startup is its 
ability to build sound business practices and plans that set it up for success (Cierpicki, 
Wright, Malcolm, & Sharp, 2000; Sedighadeli & Kachouie, 2013). 
Consistently the narrative of investments in innovative technology does not rely on 
the technology as the anchor point. Instead, investors look for teams and people who are 
capable of executing (Cusumano, 2013). They do this because teams who can execute 
strategies outpace teams who worry about creating strategies. An idea without a team will 
go nowhere. Therefore, understanding the way that startups develop and execute 
strategies and also how they develop management structures would lead to a better 
understanding of how to determine why new entrants are able to compete successfully 
against established firms. 
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III. Research Model 
 
The complexity behind innovation warrants a closer look. Technical innovation is the 
central driver of these firms and is encompassed by two general areas: core concepts and 
components. They are fundamental to understanding the framework for defining 
innovation (Clark & Henderson, 1990). Core concepts defines our understanding of how 
things work. Components refers to the essential parts which are used to create a product. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Differentiating between different forms of innovation (Clark & 
Henderson, 1990) 
 
The most difficult of the four, radical and architectural innovation have the greatest 
impact on their respective industries. These kinds of innovation are seldom seen but have 
far-reaching impact that typically overturns more than one industry. For this paper, we will 
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be focusing on architectural innovation where core concepts are reinforced but the linkage 
between them is changed. When we understand how a company forms its business around 
a set of components and core concepts we begin to understand how their product or a 
service can displace established competitors. The important differentiation to make here is 
that the success of the company does not rely on the product itself. Architectural innovation 
instead focuses on the company’s understanding of its product as it relates to the market 
and competition. Usually it takes root initially in simple applications at the bottom of a 
market and then relentlessly moves up (Christensen, 2012). By changing the bottom of the 
market small firms can create disruptive products that are so cost affordable and simple 
that the market evolves and threatens established firms. 
An enterprise’s job is to maximize shareholder wealth. Architectural Innovation 
stresses this relationship. Redesigning how a core concept is used or reconfiguring 
components to adapt their use case is secondary to ensuring organization structuring is 
achieved. Not only are large firms regimented in their ways but they are also generally 
unreceptive to new schools of thought. This leads to a complacency wherein an 
unwillingness to commit or change the existing thought process leads to one of two 
scenarios. First, the large firm is unable to tailor the experience associated with the 
product despite being able to manufactured it well. This stems from a hesitance to rewire 
and rethink the implications of an innovative method. Or second, they get left behind as 
SMEs carry forward with their innovations and disrupt the space. Inevitably, the large 
enterprises will attempt to recover their smaller market that has been stolen by the smaller 
firms. 
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Innovation is not a game of speed or resources; it is a game of evolutions.  Large 
firms have the resources and connections for both existing and future products. They are 
well positioned for the expectation of growth and are capable of initiating conversations 
if needed. The acquisition and possession of materials and resources is not what defines 
innovation – execution is key. Startups do not have the similar resources on hand that 
large enterprises process. Instead desperation drives constant change, pushing the 
company forward. Success is too often paralleled with a small firm’s ability to constantly 
rethink how they are going to execute strategies instead of determining them.  
An understanding of the channels, filters, and strategies (fundamental elements for 
planning and executing architectural innovation) employed by the firm allows us to 
explore the question of unique knowledge that allows small firms to be successful. 
Channels refer to the company’s interactions, formal and informal, that are critical to 
its task (Clark & Henderson, 1990). Whether they be multimillion dollar design contracts 
or advisors, these resources are vital to the organization. They serve as the backbone for 
negotiations and business dealings and set the standard for capacity. These channels have 
traditionally separated startups from being able to compete with large firms. The game of 
resources has always favored the financially sound giants who set the industry standard. 
Only recently have these barriers to entry begun to shift as investor confidence is being 
restored (Porat, 2015). This has allowed startups to be competitive with their channels. 
While the cost of resources and connections has been a pain point for startups, the 
importance of being able to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant channels is a 
contended one. Filters fulfill this role as they allow the organization to identify 
immediately what is most crucial in its information system (Clark & Henderson, 1990). 
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They provide an organizational differentiation between items of relevance and those less 
important. By being selective and knowledgeable about the needs and wants for new 
projects, firms are able to optimize their filters. Startups have a significant filter 
advantage because they are experiencing this innovation from the ground up. Unlike 
large firms, startups filter their channels as they grow. Large firms may find their ability 
to gather new information constrained by the filters that they have in place and cannot 
change, or do not know they need to change. In startups, pertinent filters are formed that 
are designed to impact the specific needs of a new product or service. This knowledge 
allows new entrants to build a competitive business advantage that is directed and 
focused from the ground up. 
Strategies dictate the future of a business. Where startups succeed is in their ability to 
rewire their strategic thinking. Established firms ask how they can get their channels 
filtered to match their strategies. This process is different in startups because they ask 
what do they do to get their strategies to channels so they filter them out to find the best 
solution. They understand their strategies and how they need to get them to the 
appropriate channels; this application occurs when startups apply appropriate filters to 
their channels. This knowledge allows startups an advantage because they can focus on 
product validation as opposed to product testing. The former validates their company’s 
existence because it is well received by their audience while the later serves as proof their 
product works. 
Understanding how startups are able to form their channels, filters, and strategies 
requires an intimate examination from start to finish. As such this paper borrows case 
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study research practices from Eisenhardt which features a process that is highly iterative 
and tightly linked to data appropriate for new topic areas as seen in Figure 2 (1989). 
 
Figure 2 - Process of building theory from case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
To get started it was important to ask questions and research the established firms. 
Exploring why it is possible for startups who have seemingly no chance to compete 
provides an insight to the challenges they face. It makes the most sense to choose one 
company for this as an intimate knowledge and analysis can provide a template for future 
research. On The Wall, Inc. was chosen because it has been well documented since its 
inception and had no preexisting structure. 
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The instruments and protocols came in the form of a qualitative analysis of a one year 
diary kept on the company’s decisions and meetings, both internally and externally. 
Examining the field occurred as overlap amongst the diary pages came forth and different 
business elements surfaced notably: Hardware, software, marketing, finance, legal, 
venture capital, equity, management, mentorship, partnerships, Kickstarter, and 
prototyping. Qualitative analysis of these elements makes the most sense because it opens 
the way to interpret and understand the logic behind the writer of the notes (Eisenhardt, 
1989). By examining the channels, filters, and strategies startups employ with their 
businesses can we begin to understand how their changing architectural innovation leads 
them to knowledge that allows them a competitive business advantage. 
I use the case study of my company On The Wall, Inc., a startup in the smart mirror 
business, coupled with research on architectural innovation to explore how the channels, 
filters, and strategies that a startup employs may result in patterns of thinking that lead 
startups to gain a competitive business advantage. My research question, therefore, is 
“How does architectural innovation in startups lead to competitive business advantage 
over large established firms in the smart mirror market?” 
 
IV. Propositions 
	
Through the research gathered from On The Wall, Inc. this paper seeks to support the 
early formation of channels, filters, and strategies. Startups in innovative sectors begin 
with no or very few of these elements and thus develop them differently than established 
companies. This influences the way they grow and supports the idea architectural 
innovation provides new entrants a competitive business advantage. 
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P1: Channels form differently in startups than they do in established 
companies. 
a) Startups do not have vast resources they can draw from initially.  
b) Resources come from the interactions the company has with 
outside influences where they are operating from a position of 
lesser value.  
P2: Themes appear in channel blocks for startups as they focus on 
channel development. 
a) Channels tend to be very focused in groups. These themes are 
transitioned to filters and strategies to allow the startup to move 
to establishing new channels. 
b) Startups determine the level of importance of channels quickly 
and those which add little value are either transitioned out or 
adapted as filters. 
P3: Filters are important because they cause companies to focus their 
channels. 
a) As startups grow they strategically design their filters to reflect 
their channels positively. 
b) Filters are relatively unused in startups because they impeded 
architectural innovation more than they help. 
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P4: Filters appear less frequently in startup architecture. Startups focus 
their development on channels as they grow and do not close off 
their resources permanently. 
a) Themes in startups develop time sensitive filters. 
b) Filters become less frequent as the organization’s strategies 
become more defined. 
P5: Strategies are how companies take advantage of their channels. 
Startups develop their strategies differently from established firms. 
a) The limited channels startups begin with forces them to develop 
strategies without resources. 
b) Strategies without the restrictions of available resources allows 
startups to explore non-traditional channels. 
P6: Themes, while present in a startup’s strategies, are much more 
scattered than their counterparts.  
a) If startups form their strategies based on the channels they have 
they are unable to move forward at an accelerated pace. 
b) Startups become more refined with their strategies as they 
become developed. 
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V. Research Approach 
 
This research paper will observe the developments of small enterprise called On The 
Wall, Inc. which is a smart mirror company incorporated in and based out of Oxford, MS. 
The company shows key performance indicators which point toward architectural 
innovation within their field. Currently no major company is working on smart mirror 
technology and as such the market does exist but is largely undeveloped and under 
explored. Having raised $200,000 in capital the company shares milestones many other 
successful startups possess. 
The research portion of this paper will center around information gathered by the 
company’s chief executive officer. Given the nature of being a startup it is assumed that 
the CEO is intimately involved with most every decision made by the business. This is an 
important distinction to make about the information because it will contain multiple 
interwoven channels, filters, and strategies. Because of this it stands to reason that amidst 
the day to day operations of the company, time is spent by upper level management 
sorting and adapting information to fit each of the three and as a result forming the 
beginnings of the company’s history of channels, filters, and strategies. 
The information will be gathered and kept in the form of a diary used as a record of 
the day-to-day meetings the CEO engages in with both internal and external persons 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2008). These interactions will form the qualitative 
research of the paper and serve as the backbones to determine how linkages in the 
company’s architecture evolve.  
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The procedure for analyzing the diary was as follow. First, each line was separated 
into its respective focus. This was aided by assigning certain key elements colors to 
create a colorized summary of those elements. Furthermore, inputting the data into a 
searchable schematic allowed for keywords, channels, filters, strategies, and internal and 
external points to be highlighted to further draw attention to the metadata associated with 
each memo. Special notes were kept for external correspondences to denote the 
difference in communication and openness. Accordingly, internal meetings revolved 
around weekly meetings designed to serve as updates as well as checkmarks for progress 
made between meetings. 
Documentation of the software and hardware development cycle was overlooked for 
the purposes of this paper in exchange for more detail on the executive and managerial 
oversight associated with it. In this regard, the nature of the paper distinguished itself 
from being product focused and examined the architectural innovation associated with 
starting a technology startup in an unexplored space. This is different because it provided 
a unique perspective on the creation of a company that is specifically situated around a 
single product line. 
 
VI. Discussion 
 
Startups inherently exist in a state of disadvantages. From conception to their IPO 
or purchase there is consistent work against established businesses to distinguish 
themselves and survive. Because of this narrative of struggle that is so consistent 
throughout startup stories when these new firms do succeed, often at magnitudes 
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greater than their established counterparts, there is an intense interest in 
understanding why.  
With On The Wall, Inc. the story remains much the same. Limited resources 
dominated the picture from the very start.  
 
Table 1 - Available resources 
Resource Tangible/Intangible Theme Available from 
Start 
Personal Investments 
totaling ~$30,000.00 
Tangible Financials Yes 
Smart home experience Intangible Software Yes 
Entrepreneurship experience Intangible Business Yes 
Development tools Tangible Software Yes 
Local business connections Intangible Business Yes 
 
 A mixture of tangible and intangible resources composed much of the first 6-8 
months of the venture. Experienced founders grew the vision of the company from the 
start taking advantage of the few tangible resources that they did have. These provided 
the foundation for the channels which would provide the initial decisions that would 
begin to shape the direction of the Company. 
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Figure 3 - Channel developments to strategy 
The channels which the Company created stemmed from the external 
relationships it had managed to form with its limited resources. As those channels 
became more diversified it became necessary to filter those channels and revisit them as 
necessary, keeping the limited resources honed on the immediate tasks required to 
maintain relevancy. Unlike established firms where channels already exist startups 
require to some degree a mixture of search and rescue: search, as in find channels and 
access them, and rescue, as in save the most important ones for the start without losing 
track of the ones that have been captured.  
It is this methodology which provides startups with an architectural advantage 
over established firms. By starting from scratch, they are able to strategically spend time 
searching and acquiring channels which are specific to their needs. Established firms 
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instead spend this time dividing and strategizing which resources they can and/or have to 
use. There is a lack of freedom that limits the reactivity of the management in these firms. 
As these channels become filtered they are redesigned to accompany an evolution 
of strategy in these startups. This becomes obvious within On The Wall as it developed 
its legal strategy.  
 
Figure 4 - External legal development 
Above, the decision to discuss the provisional patent application filing with an 
external source, David Sawrie, became a filter for the Company. To acquire value for the 
Company, focus on creating a competitive advantage through intellectual property 
changed the strategy for value creation. The channel became the means to capture that 
value and filters were put in place to ensure that it was prioritized over other business 
decisions. 
We see this channel prioritization again within the Company as it filters its legal 
structure to focus on agreements and classifications. 
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Figure 5 - Internal legal development 
These internal channels become focused on moving value and other strategies forward. 
Ownership and contract developments displayed in Figure 5 impacted strategies 
throughout the Company. As the channels are filtered and updated they begin to reflect 
new strategies such as investor relations, hiring agreements, and external relationships.  
 In startups like On The Wall these channels are essential in developing the 
company’s architecture. Because there is no pre-established way of engaging channels, in 
part because those channels do not yet exist, there is little confusion as to what new 
channels are hired to do. Channels which are confusing or add little value are transitioned 
or filtered to new channels to further influence the company’s strategies. 
 One interesting effect of this innovation is that channels in startups appear in 
groups associated with themes. As these themes transition through channels to filters and 
are incorporated into strategies they provide new movement throughout the organization. 
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Table 2 - Themes in channels, themes for On The Wall, Inc. include law, equity/salary, 
and financials. 
Date Themes Notes 
2/17/16	 Law	 - Talk	with	David	and	his	OS	guy	about	going	
the	open	source	route	and	licensing	
4/20/16	 Law	 - Follow-up	meeting	with	UM	law,	discussions	
about	separating	businesses	
4/27/16	 Equity/Salary	 - Talk	with	Sam	about	equity	distribution	
amongst	initial	contractors	(brief)	
5/5/16	 Equity/Salary	 - Equity	distribution	talk	again	this	time	focused	
on	difference	between	OTW	and	O2E	
5/20/16	 Equity/Salary	 - First	talk	about	Alex	consulting	
6/14/16	 Equity/Salary	 - Question	about	hiring	Alex	
6/14/16	 Financials	 - Farris	works	on	pre-order	costs	+parts	with	
Alex	and	developing	a	strategic	accounting	
plan	
6/16/16	 Financials	 - Met	with	Farris	to	discuss	what	accounting	
software	we	were	going	to	use	
6/16/16	 Marketing/Website	 - Work	with	Georgia	on	marketing	and	
predictions	
6/16/16	 Financials	 - Accounting	goals	
 
This theme grouping throughout the formation of channels for the Company 
indicate that there is a level of focus that dictates the importance of the strategies they 
compliment. While established firms may have more experience with managing themes 
as they appear, what separates startups is their awareness of how to prioritize the limited 
resources they have. In doing so they create a strategic advantage regarding their overall 
goals which allow them to move quickly and precisely from theme to theme. This 
specificity is the key to distinguishing the importance of various channels to overall 
company strategies. 
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Table 3 - Themes in channels cont. include relationships 
Date	 Themes	 Notes	
10/25/16	 Law	 - Got	a	message	from	Danny	about	the	
agreement	
- Email	NunoErin	and	bcc	Joyce	–	suggestions	
w/	red	line	
- Changes	made	clear	that	Alex	is	a	separate	
party	
- Business	opportunity	agreed	upon	
11/3/16	 Relationship	 - $100K	VC,	110	corporate	partners,	don’t	take	
equity,	pre-seed	to	a	VC,	no	need	to	be	on	
site,	business	development,	100-150	
companies	selected,	Perseus	mirrors	is	in	
their	current	batch	
11/8/16	 Law	 - Sam’s	illnesses	affecting	timeline	
11/23/16	 Financials	 - Advice	on	financials	on	how	to	explain	it	to	
another	business	person	
11/23/16	 Relationship	 - Look	for	someone	to	manage	an	IT	project	
11/29/16	 Relationship	 - NunoErin	–	progress/timeline	on	the	project	
they	gave	us,	what	are	we	doing	with	them	
11/29/16	 Marketing/Website	 - Conversation	with	Georgia	about	design	
experience	
11/30/16	 Prototype	 - Alex’s	work	for	hire	–	CAD	drawings	
11/30/16	 Marketing/Website	 - Alex’s	work	for	hire	–	website	
contribution/app	presentation,	content	
contribution/creation	
12/2/16	 Competitions	 - Carolina	Crews	–	Times	AR/VR	Top	100	
- Mark	–	advisory	board	recommendations	
12/8/16	 Relationship	 - Call	with	Georgia	setting	her	up	with	a	
marketing	advisor	
12/8/16	 Relationship	 - Call	with	Farris	setting	him	up	with	a	CPA	
advisor	
12/8/16	 Relationship	 - Drive	over	and	meet	Carolina	–	Time	
Magazine’s	AR/VR	woman	
 
The aforementioned channels and the strategies which resulted from their 
development led the way to new channels which helped prolong the life of the Company. 
Specifically, we see that there is a new theme which dominates the later part of the year 
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which was not present at the beginning. The inclusion of new partnerships and 
relationships later is a continuation of the channels from the beginning of the year. 
Similar to the channel definition the Company enjoyed relative to its competitors this 
freedom to pick and choose partners is another benefit shared by startup architecture that 
is not present in established firms whose commitments to existing partners jeopardizes 
this freedom. 
As startups grow they strategically design their filters to reflect their channels 
positively. In doing so they are very selective in their implementation. 
 
Table 4 - Selective filter implementation 
Date	 Filters	 Notes	
1/4/16	 ReflektOS	 - REST	architecture	being	
scalable/cheap	
1/27/16	 Law	 - Meeting	with	UM	law	
students	about	owners	of	
company	and	taxes	
2/17/16	 Competitions	 - Plan	to	submit	for	the	
competition	if	possible	
despite	two	paths	
4/20/16	 Law	 - Filing	LLC,	operating	
agreements,	contract	
agreements,	decision	for	no	
employee	agreements	
5/20/16	 Law	 - Business	documents	
needed	
6/14/16	 Kickstarter	 - Mandatory	8	weeks	of	
planning	for	Kickstarter,	
shooting	for	60%	
6/14/16	 Marketing/Website	 - Have	Alex	work	on	front	
end	web	design	with	Reid	
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As was the case for On The Wall, filters were not frequently implemented in the first six 
months. When they were, they were the result of the channel evolution previously 
discussed. These filters served to help the Company focus on its channels. 
 Filters remain relatively unused in startups, however, because they impede 
architectural innovation more than they help. As strategies become more dominant and 
established and the search for channels takes over the narrative for the CEO filters fall to 
the wayside. A logical explanation for this is that as the startup becomes better equipped 
to implement channels the need for filters cease to become an overarching architectural 
concern and start to see a rise in departments and individuals. On The Wall saw this 
move. Later adaptations of filters slipped away from overarching strategies and were 
applied to individuals. Individuals fulfilling marketing, financial, and product design 
work were tasked with jobs to work towards their department’s specific goal. Marketing 
was filtered to benefit the Kickstarter, see Table 5. Financing was limited to tax 
preparation and budget tasks, while product design was tasked with external relations 
related to finishing the prototype, see Table 6. 
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Table 5 - Limitations of filters, Kickstarter 
Date	 Filters	 Notes	
8/23/16	 Kickstarter	 - Basic	questions,	standout	project,	rewards,	
funds,	promotion,	communicating	with	backers,	
fulfillment,	Perseus	Mirrors	Kickstarter	
campaign,	PanL,	Adept,	Smart	Mirror,	DoodleVU,	
Senic	
- ,	campaign	timeline,	campaign	promotion,	
campaign	materials,	campaign	page,	the	
campaign	
8/26/16	 	 (empty)	
8/29/16	 	 (empty)	
9/1/16	 	 (empty)	
9/8/16	 	 (empty)	
9/11/16	 	 (empty)	
10/20/16	 	 (empty)	
10/25/16	 	 (empty)	
11/3/16	 	 (empty)	
11/8/16	 	 (empty)	
11/11/16	 	 (empty)	
	
 
Table 6 - Limitations of filters, product design 
Date	 Filters	 Notes	
12/23/16	 Prototype	 - Alex	–	meeting	with	NunoErin	1/3,	1/10,	
1/17,	case	ready	for	printing	1/18,	printed	
case	1/19,	finish	iterations	of	case	1/26,	
metal	version	of	case	1/31	
1/23/16	 Kickstarter	 - Film	Kickstarter	2/1	–	2/15,	launch	Kickstarter	
2/15	
1/10/17	 	 (empty)	
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1/13/17	 	 (empty)	
1/19/17	 	 (empty)	
1/20/17	 Law	 - Joyce	legal	release	for	content/interviews	
1/25/17	 	 (empty)	
1/27/17	 	 (empty)	
2/1/17	 	 (empty)	
 
Filters for this reason become much more time sensitive for startups as time 
progresses. Whereas firms with track records are capable of filtering their productivity 
and strategies from the beginning, this becomes a learned skill throughout the company’s 
architecture as the new firm matures. During this maturation, the organization’s strategies 
become much more defined and filters are applied to departments and individuals and 
away from the overarching strategies of the company. 
The limited channels startups begin with are impetuses for them to begin 
developing strategies to capitalize on resource acquisition, often with multiple strategies 
in mind. On The Wall, Inc. recognized its lack of resources from early on and made 
efforts to maximize its ability to acquire new channels. 
 
Table 7 - A strategic start to capitalize on future opportunties 
Date	 Strategies	 Notes	
1/4/16	 Marketing/Website	 - Business	cards	for	future	meetings	
1/9/16	 Competitions	 - Discussion	about	presenting	business	
for	CIE	competition	
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1/28/16	 Competitions	 - Continued	development	for	the	
business	competition	
2/8/16	 Marketing/Website	 - Logo	design,	first	OTW	design	
 
These strategies lined up On The Wall for expanding into channels which 
provided value to them. From business meetings and future competitions to establishing a 
consistent image, both online and offline, these initial strategies focused on innovating 
channel creation. Unlike established firms whose strategies will revolve around 
expanding or implementing existing channels into new innovations, every strategy for 
startups is designed with the new company in mind from the ground up. 
This limitation also lends itself to startups exploring non-traditional channels to 
expand their resource pool. On The Wall looks to explore Kickstarter, an online 
crowdfunding platform, to capitalize on marketing and exposure that it would not have 
access to without large funds of capital to spend on marketing, surveys, and production 
runs.  
 
Table 8 - Kickstarter strategy 
Date	 Strategies	 Notes	
2/17/16	 Kickstarter	 - Talks	about	launching	a	Kickstarter	
led	to	discussions	about	creating	a	
prototype	
5/20/16	 Kickstarter	 - Discussions	about	a	makeup	mirror	
for	Kickstarter	
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These non-traditional platforms require a different architecture than what 
established firms are used to. As such new entrants are often more aware of these 
platforms than their counterparts and use them much more frequently to unlock channels 
they would otherwise be foreign to from their starts. Because of this they develop their 
strategies to reflect goals and opportunities which are relevant to taking advantage of 
these channels. 
 Another feature of the way that startups develop their strategies is that they are 
often constructed with the understanding that the channels will come later. The limited 
resource approach forces startups to develop strategies that are acutely aware of their 
absence. A result of this is that they create new strategies or design filters to ensure that 
those channels are fulfilled. For On the Wall, Inc. examples of these strategies can be 
found in Table 9 where plans for Kickstarter and sales have already been implemented 
without a physical prototype or operating system to distribute. This led them to pursue 
avenues to expedite the production process and filter the work done by individuals to 
capture the most important channels necessary to fulfill these strategies. 
 
Table 9 - Strategies that lack channels 
Date	 Strategies	 Notes	
6/14/16	 Marketing/Website	 - Start	prefacing	Georgia	to	work	on	
marketing	strategy	for	NotisMe	
6/14/16	 Marketing/Website	 - Reid	works	on	both	websites	
6/14/16	 Kickstarter	 - Plan	for	the	Kickstarter	is	to	have	a	
makeup	mirror	for	sale	for	$300-400	
6/14/16	 Prototype	 - By	summer	have	a	prototype	finished	
to	show	off	to	investors	
6/14/16	 Financials	 - Aim	to	raise	$100K	+	VC	with	video	
6/14/16	 Prototype	 - Have	a	demo	done	by	mid-July	
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6/14/16	 Prototype	 - Prototyping	firm	said	they	can	make	
the	first	makeup	mirror	for	$50-75K	
 
 Yet as these strategies became more refined and focused their structure seemed to 
dissipate. On The Wall, as it became more developed from a managerial perspective, 
implemented more strategies to deal with its growing pains. The CEO observed these 
changes through the legal portion of the company. 
 
Table 10 - Shift in legal strategies 
Date	 Strategies	 Notes	
6/19/16	 Law	 - All	work	is	work	for	
hire,	everything	
produced	is	owned	
by	On	The	Wall	
6/21/16	 Law		 - Open	source	MIT	
license	code	for	On	
The	Wall	
 
As the company grew the strategies corresponding with work for hire, production, and 
licensing became much more scattered. What had previously only been a strategy focused 
on acquiring a patent and structuring a business was now transformed to focus on solving 
the branches which grew from those solutions but also the continuation of the other 
strategies which had been adopted by the other individuals working for the Company. 
The Company shows a fluidity here that aptly deals with the architectural finesse required 
for consistent growth. The pivots occur naturally throughout firm growth but the 
difference here is that new entrants are able to use the knowledge they learn along the 
way to tailor their organizational responses to hone the company towards its end goal. 
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VII. Limitations 
	
This research paper experienced a couple of limitations which would be of interest to 
consider further. Given the brevity of the research and the timeframe proposed there was 
no possible way for the researchers to follow the growth of On The Wall, Inc. through to 
its end. However, this is the nature of working with a startup from its inception. For this 
reason, it would be beneficial for future readers to conduct their own research on the 
Company and compare the current state of On The Wall, Inc. to what is presented here in 
this paper. 
Furthermore, this paper conducts itself solely from the view of the CEO of the On 
The Wall team. As is the case with this it must be assumed that his literature is biased and 
recollected of his own perspective and not that of the rest of the team. This presented a 
unique, unblemished insight into his thoughts and decisions for the company. Future 
researchers on this topic would do well to collect more diaries which would inevitably 
produce more views and hopefully a better insight to the channels, filters, and strategies 
prevalent throughout the entire organization. 
Another noted limitation of this research is the nature of the work and focus the CEO 
put into the diary and the Company. That is to say that the CEO at the time of this 
research was pursuing work with On The Wall in his free time outside of a part-time job 
and a full-time course load. Similarities with these time constraints exist amongst many 
startups and add to the novelty of following a startup’s CEO. This may have effects on 
the ability to manage the individuals of the team as well as focus on multiple strategies at 
once akin to the work a full-time employee might be able to. 
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An interesting note for future researchers interested in pursuing the topic of startups 
and the architecture that arises throughout their growth period is the young nature of the 
startups. The average age of the On The Wall team was 21 at the time this research was 
collected. It is safe to assume that there was a lack of work force experience which would 
be attributed to work done at established firms for lengths lasting longer than one year. In 
part this is what made examining On The Wall interesting as the architecture and 
decisions which were made were crafted in the middle of learning and often from 
intuition as well, however, this knowledge acquisition is part of most narratives of 
startups. I do not think that it detracts from the validity of this research merely poses an 
interesting question as to whether age or industry experience affects the knowledge which 
is able to be capture by startups. 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
	
In conclusion, I have provided an illustration of the mechanisms of architectural 
innovation that lead to knowledge that allows new entrants a competitive business 
advantage. The advantages that established companies have is superior, but the 
complexity it creates in the innovation process provides an opportunity for new entrants 
to surface and be competitive. 
Where new entrants struggle to gain access to channels which are closed to them they 
gain a tactical advantage in the freedom of choice and strategy to pursue the most 
immediate benefactor. Established firms are often bound to existing partners and 
relationships which hinders their ability to freely do business and the limitations 
associated with doing business elsewhere or even in a different way impacts their ability 
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to be reactive and innovative in a new industry that expects its competitors to be exactly 
that, but there are benefits. These partners often carry with them exclusive deals and 
developed relationships which account for rapid movement and profitable industry 
connections.  
When new firms are able to quickly change the way they innovate and manage 
themselves they are able to consistently handle new problems quickly and efficiently 
allowing them to accelerate throw the learning phases associated with growing in an 
industry, existing or new. 
New entrants’ ability, then, to filter their channels and strategies is somewhat 
unprecedented. Filters do not particularly exist because these startups need to be open to 
everything at a moment’s notice. As an alternative, these firms adopt strategies 
throughout their organization to act as filters in place of traditional filters. This allows 
individuals to focus their work without limiting it to specific channels or strategies where 
established firms will set filters on work, relationships, and individuals. This relationship 
between a strategy that guides versus a strategy that constrains sits at the core of the 
strategic direction all firms take. 
Definitively the greatest strength that these new entrants have is their ability to be 
reactive. As they grow their ability to be reactive increases but also becomes at risk for 
being overwhelmed by filters and strategies that attempt to quell the organizations ability 
to be reactive. By taking advantage of their unique architecture they can respond and 
move about their industry much faster than their competitors and it is this knowledge of 
how to move and how to be a new entrant that gives them their competitive business 
advantage.   
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